



Clyde W. SUMMERS '
O UR PREOCCUPATION with the relation between unions and employers
and that between unions and political processes has diverted us
from studying the underlying relation between the union and its members.
Study of this relationship is of the greatest difficulty. The relationship
cannot be viewed in purely legal terms, for in most countries there is
relatively little positive law concerning internal union affairs. We must
look beyond the judicial decisions and statutes to the union's own
internal law. The union's constitution or rules are the governing statutes
defining the rights of the individual in the union. But examination of
these documents is not enough, for they are so overlaid with custom and
reshaped by institutional forces that the words may fail to reveal the rules
applied in practice. We must, therefore, look to the rules and practices
actually applied within the union.
Our first stumbling-block is that we do not know enough about the
internal life of trade unions, for few searching studies have been made of
the structure of union government and its practical operation. However,
our greater obstacle is that we lack a framework of analysis which will
enable us to examine the union's internal process and relate it to the
political, economic and social processes of which it is an integral part.
We have no standard for measuring the rights of the individual in the
union or the relevance of those rights to society. The purpose of this
paper is to try, with the aid of national reports from 16 countries, to
suggest a framework of analysis which may be useful in further studies.
I Professor at the Law School, Yale University, New Haven, Connecticut. This article
is based on the General Report given at the Fifth International Congress for Labour and
Social Security Law, held in Lyons, France, September 1963. The General Report drew on
national reports from Argentina, Belgium, Brazil, Chile, France, Germany (Federal Republic),
Hungary, Japan, South Korea, Peru, Poland, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United
States and Yugoslavia. The General Report and the supporting national reports will be
published in the near future in the proceedings of the congress.
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The purpose here is not to define what the relationship between a union
and its members should be in any country. It is rather to suggest some
of the relevant questions which will aid in defining and evaluating that
relationship in each country.
The source of our concern with trade unions
The threshold question is: Why should we be specially concerned
with the relationship between the trade union and its members? From
among voluntary associations such as social clubs, political parties or
religious groups, why should we single out unions for separate considera-
tion? Our answer to this basic question will inevitably determine the
direction of our whole line of inquiry.
Our concern with the relationship between the union and its members,
I believe, has its roots in the special role which unions in a democracy
perform in ordering society and their impact on the lives of individual
workers. First and foremost, the union engages in collective bargaining.
The collective agreements which it negotiates with employers establish
terms and conditions of employment which serve to regulate the labour
market. More important, the collective agreement vitally affects, if not
practically controls, the individual's employment contract. In addition
the union may provide and control access to essential social benefits such
as pensions, medical services, unemployment benefits, or legal services
to enforce rights relating to employment. Thus the union, as collective
bargaining representative and in other ways, exercises substantial regula-
tory power over the working life of every individual who comes within
its domain.
The scope of the union's control and the tightness with which it
binds the individual differ between the various countries, but in every one
which has a trade union movement worthy of the name decisions made
by the union can affect the member as immediately and conclusively as
decisions by government itself. Wages negotiated by the union may be
more important to the member than taxes levied by the government.
Denial of a pension brings equal hardship to the individual whether it is
by a union official or a state agency. In a democracy the exercise by any
group of such power over individuals raises pressing questions as to the
rights of members within the organisation.
Our special concern with the internal processes of unions is reinforced,
if not compelled, because the union's power and control is a product of
deliberate government policy. In the labour market, regulation through
collective bargaining is consciously chosen as the alternative to government
control. In some countries, such as the United States, the law has protected
the right of unions to organise in order to encourage the process of
collective bargaining, with the explicit objective of avoiding government
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regulation of the terms and conditions of employment. In countries like
Sweden collective bargaining developed without any legal protection but
it has long been heavily relied upon by the Government as an integral part
of the regulation of the labour market. When the collective agreement is
extended to other employers or other employees by government order,
as in France or the Federal Republic of Germany, or when the majority
union is certified as the exclusive bargaining agent, as in the United States,
the designation of unions as instruments for governing the labour market
is undisguised. The agreement negotiated by the " representative " union
is explicitly given the imprint of government, making it applicable to all
workers, union and non-union alike. Countries differ widely in the degree
to which they rely on collective bargaining, but whatever that degree the
control exercised by unions through collective bargaining is a form of
governing power allocated to them by government in the ordering of
society.
In addition, unions in many countries are recognised by government
as the representative of employees generally in nominations to official
bodies and the developing of governmental policies. In countries as
disparate as Chile and the Federal Republic of Germany the labour
representatives appointed to bodies governing social security programmes
are in practice those nominated by the trade unions; in both the latter
country and Sweden the unions designate lay judges for the labour courts;
and in the United Kingdom wage orders establishing minimum standards
must follow the recommendations of a wage council on which an officer
of the interested union commonly sits as an official member. In these and
many other ways unions are drawn into the councils of government and
share directly the power of government.
In democratic countries this allocation of power and control to the
union commonly performs two vital political functions. First, it creates
centres of power and instruments of control apart from the State, which
then does not become unmanageable or dangerously large. Collective
bargaining shortens the reach of central legal control by establishing a
separate structure of industrial government as an alternative to suffocating
statism. Second, allocation of power to unions widens and deepens
the channels of democratic expression. Historically the trade union
movement has been built on the democratic model, its officers chosen
by and responsible to the members, and its policies expressing the desires
of the members. Unions are allowed to share governing power at least in
part because they provide a means for making the voice of the workers
heard. Through collective bargaining unions carry a measure of demo-
cracy into industrial government; through union representation in
government agencies workers gain a voice in decisions which touch vital
interests. Thus unions serve as instruments for distributing power in the
ordering of society, and power is allocated to them with the hope, if not
the obligation, that they provide channels of democratic control.
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Our concern with the relationship between the union and its members
is akin to our concern with the relationship between the State and its
citizens. In broader terms, it is with the relationship between the governing
power and the individuals governed. The special role of unions and their
impact on the lives of individual workers set them apart ftom almost all
other voluntary associations, and justifies if not compels separate study
of union processes. The most nearly comparable organisation is the
employers' association which, it seems to me, should be subject to
similar study.
The areas of inquiry
This statement of the source of our concern and the nature of our
problem helps to suggest what relevant questions should be asked in
studying the relationship between the union and its members. There are
at least three basic areas of inquiry. First, what is the scope of the union's
control over the individual and how closely is he bound by its decisions?
The answer has been sketched in general terms, but there are significant
variations and it is important to identify some of the factors which
measure the size and nature of the union's control. Second, what freedom
does the individual have to choose whether or not to be subject to the
union's control ? This question involves an inquiry as to what freedom
he has either to choose between available unions or to stand outside
the system of collective control. Third, what rights does the individual
have within the union's own processes of government ? The central
concern here is the right of the member to have a voice in the decisions
of his union, but there are also other important rights arising out of
proceedings before union tribunals and the distribution of benefits to
union members.
It is evident that these areas of inquiry are not independent of one
another, for the relationship between the union and the individual is a
product of the interaction of these basic elements. The importance of the
individual's right to participate in making the decisions of the union
varies with the union's power and control; the need for a fair hearing
before a member is expelled is directly related to the value of continued
union membership. It is impossible here even to suggest all the lines of
interaction. The most that can be done is to identify some of the critical
elements which must be considered if we are to examine more closely
and see in better perspective this relationship between the union and the
individual.
As we noted at the outset we cannot confine our inquiry to the
formal legal rules, for it is evident that the relationship is largely a product
of private institutions and defined less by legal rules than by the informal
law of collective bargaining structures and union rules or practices.
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Indeed, the fragmentary character of the positive law reflects the most
difficult and fundamental question which is implicit in the whole inquiry-
to what extent does the State intervene in the affairs of these private
institutions ? Here we confront a tension between two opposing demands.
On the one hand, government cannot allocate control to private groups
and deny responsibility for how that power is exercised. In a democracy,
where concern is not only with the substance of regulation but also with
the process through which decisions are made, government cannot be
indifferent to the internal processes of organisations to which governing
power has been allocated. On the other hand, one of the primary purposes
of this allocation in a democracy is to avoid monolithic state control.
But this purpose is defeated if the State so closely supervises unions that
they lose all independence and become little more than administrative
arms of state control.
The scope of union control over the individual
The first basic element in the relationship between the union and its
members is the power and control exercised by the union over the
individual. Its scope and nature in each country is significantly different,
for it is the product of various factors which combine in widely varying
patterns. The important task at this point is not to detail the various
national patterns but rather to identify the principal factors which
measure the size and shape of the union's control. Among the most
critical are the following: (1) the areas of the individual's economic life-
such as wages, job security, medical care or pension-within the union's
sphere of control either through the collective bargaining process or
through benefits administered by the union; (2) the union's economic
strength or ability in dealing with employers to make its policies effective
and enforce its decisions; (3) the extent to which an individual within
the union's sphere of control is free to bargain on his own behalf and
able to obtain benefits different from those provided by the union;
(4) the availability of competing unions between which the individual
may choose if he is dissatisfied with the one to which he belongs; (5) the
existence and effectiveness of related institutions (such as works councils
or shop stewards) through which workers are represented when conditions
of employment are determined; and (6) the extent of governmental
control of the labour market either in regulating particular terms or in
enforcing wage policies which restrict the union's freedom.
Each of these major factors is itself composed of numerous elements
including legal rules, institutional structures, economic conditions and
social attitudes. Thus the economic strength of the union may depend
not only on its size or financial reserves but also on the legality of second-
ary strike funds, the nature of the employers' association, the level of
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unemployment, and the sense of solidarity among workers. To delineate
all of the factors and elements is beyond the scope of this paper, but
enough has been said to suggest the direction and nature of the inquiry
which must be made to determine the nature and pattern of union control
in each country. But even without full inquiry it is quite clear that in
every one of the countries under consideration which has a substantial
trade union movement unions hold some form of regulatory power and
exercise a significant measure of control over individual workers within
their sphere. It is this power and control which directs us to the other
two areas of inquiry.
Freedom of the individual to choose whether to be subject
to union control
The individual's freedom to choose whether or not to be subject to
the union's control may be curtailed in two distinct ways. First, he may
be compelled to become a member of the union and therefore subject to
all its regulations. Second, he may be compelled to follow the union's
collective agreement even though he is not a member, and to this extent
to be controlled by the union. The first obviously raises basic problems
of the individual's right of freedom of association, but the second may
be equally or even more important in defining the relationship between
the individual and the union. Both point directly to the fundamental
question in this area of inquiry-to what extent is the relation between
the union and the individual voluntary and to what extent is it com-
pulsory ? The primary purpose here is to search out and identify the
major factors, legal and economic, which determine the scope of the
individual's freedom of choice and its limitations.
Union membership is seldom compulsory by law. In Chile, when an
industrial union is supported by 55 per cent. of the employees, all
employees are declared to be members; but this imposes no burden other
than payment of union dues. In Brazil workers are not compelled to join
the state-created unions but are compelled to pay for their support. Far
more important than legal compulsion to join or support a union are
economic pressures which may make union membership practically
compulsory. The most direct and effective economic device is the union
security or organisation clause in the collective agreement which makes
a worker's employment dependent on his union status. Other devices,
such as clauses providing special benefits for union members, impose
significant though less compelling pressures on the individual.
In general the law has responded to such a use of economic pressure
in four different ways, each of which suggests a different impact which
these union security clauses may have on the individual's freedom.
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(1) The individual can be compelled to become and to remain a
member of a particular union, as under English law. The impact on the
individual is multiple and severe. He can be deprived of freedom either to
choose between unions or to remain unorganised; and, more important,
if he violates any union rule and loses his good standing the union can
cause him to be discharged.
(2) The individual can be compelled to join. a union but not any par-
ticular union, as under Swedish law. The impact on the individual under
this rule is significantly less, for he is completely free to choose between
unions. Nor can he always be compelled to obey union rules, for if he is
threatened with expulsion by one union he may be able quickly to join a
competing union and obtain immunity.
(3) The individual can be compelled to contribute financial support
to a particular union but not to become a member, as in the United
States. The impact on the individual here affects solely his pocketbook-
he is required to contribute financial support.
(4) All forms of union security clauses may be outlawed and the
individual guaranteed the right to join any or no union as he chooses, as
in Belgium, France, the Federal Republic of Germany and Switzerland.
These four broad categories emphasise the different ways in which the
individual's freedom may be limited. However, the legal rules are in fact
seldom so simple, and we need to examine with the greatest care their
practical operation if we are to measure the extent to which they do
actually protect the worker's freedom of choice from economic pressure.
Even more, our inquiry must press beyond the legal rules to the critical
question of the extent to which workers are in fact compelled to become
members. The prevalence of union security arrangements in practice is
not measured by the legal rules. Thus in Sweden less than 10 per cent. of
the persons under collective agreements are subject to organisation
clauses; in the United Kingdom, with no legal limits on economic pressure
to compel membership, less than 20 per cent. of all workers are directly
affected by the closed shop; but in the United States, where the law
allows only compulsory dues, nearly 75 per cent. of all employees covered
by collective agreements are compelled to contribute to the union; and in
Belgium, in spite of the apparently broad legal guarantees, a number
of unions have negotiated clauses providing special benefits to union
members.
Economic pressures to join the union may be less direct and compel-
ling in form where the union has benefit programmes such as sickness
insurance, pensions, or widows' allowances. If the individual worker
cannot obtain equivalent protection elsewhere he must join the union to
provide for these needs. More important, he must keep in good standing
or he may forfeit all his accumulated rights in these benefits. Thus benefits,
pivoted on union membership, press him to conform to all union rules.
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In some countries this has proved an adequate substitute for union
security clauses.
Even though the individual can and does refuse to become a member
of the union he may not thereby escape the union's collective control, for
he may be compelled to follow its collective agreement. The outward
reach of the collective agreement to non-union employees may take four
general forms, each of which curtails the individual's freedom to choose
whether or not to be subject to the union's control.
The first form is exemplified by the United States. There the union
designated by the majority of employees in a bargaining unit becomes
the exclusive representative of all employees. The employer can negotiate
with no other union and its collective agreement becomes binding on all
employees regardless of union membership. The union's relation to the
individual is clearly compulsory. However, it must have previously been
voluntarily chosen by a majority of the employees, normally in secret
ballot. The dissenting individuals can continue their membership in the
minority union although it cannot represent them, and they can demand
another election when the collective agreement terminates.
The second form is common in many European countries. There a
collective agreement made with a number of employers or an association
can be " extended " by government order to outside employers. Extension
does not rest on a voluntary choice by the employees, for it is generally
not required that a majority of the employees covered be union members
or desire coverage. The effect of extension is to make the collective
agreement applicable to employees regardless of their union membership
or individual choice.
The third form of union control over non-members is exemplified by
Sweden. There the collective agreement may require the employer to
apply the same terms to non-union employees, and if he departs from
these terms he makes himself answerable to the union. Although the non-
union individual is not legally bound, he is in practice subject to the terms
of the collective agreement regardless of his choice to remain a non-
unionist.
Finally, the union's collective agreement often governs non-members
simply because of the strong pressures for standardisation of terms and
conditions of employment among employees doing similar work. Regard-
less of legal rules the collective agreement tends to establish a " common
rule " which governs all employees.
Our central purpose here is not to measure how voluntary the relation
between the union and the individual is in the various countries, nor to
judge how voluntary it should be. Here, as throughout this paper, the
purpose is to suggest a framework of analysis for closer and more system-
atic inquiry into the voluntariness of that relation. However, even the
limited information available makes it plain that in most countries unions
are fully voluntary only in the sense that the law itself neither commands
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the individual to become a member nor prohibits him from joining. In
many countries an individual is compelled by his employment or some
lesser economic pressure to join or support a union. In almost every
country the union's sphere of influence does not end at the boundries of
its membership but in fact extends to workers who belong to other unions
or who are unorganised.
The rights of the member within the union
We come now to the most important and also the most difficult area
of inquiry: What rights does the individual have within this collective
body which acts as his representative ? More precisely, what rights are of
primary concern, and how shall they be measured ? The basic guide must
be found in the reasons for our whole inquiry into the relation between
the union and the individual; namely the special purpose which unions
serve in a democratic society. One of the vital functions of unions is to
widen and deepen the democratic process. Therefore we should focus our
inquiry on those rights which are central to fulfilling that function.
The rights with which we are primarily concerned can be roughly
grouped under four headings: (i) the right to become and remain a
member of the union; (ii) the right to participate, directly or indirectly, in
the decisions of the union; (iii) the right to fair procedures in union
tribunals; and (iv) the right to have union funds used for proper purposes.
In measuring these rights the critical question is the extent to which they
are in fact recognised in the union's process of government. This recog-
nition may be far less a product of legal rules than of union practices, and
the individual may often seek vindication of his rights under the union's
own law administered by its own tribunals. These rights are thus defined
and protected by two bodies of law-the public law of the State and the
private law of the union. This poses the basic question of the relation
between these two bodies of law; or more explicitly, the extent to which
the State will intervene to apply its law in the union's internal process.
This basic question of the relative role of the State and the union in
defining and protecting the individual's right is preliminary to any
meaningful discussion of the scope of these rights.
Legal theory in both civil-law and common-law countries has tradi-
tionally characterised the relation between the member and his union as
one of" contract ". The union's constitution and by-laws are considered
a contract of association, and by joining the union the individual agrees
to be bound by its terms. The contract theory has been sharply criticised
in many countries as artificial and inadequate to analyse or understand
the relationship between unions and their members. Its significant function,
however, is not to describe the relation between the union and its mem-
bers but rather to explain the relation between the law and the union's
HeinOnline  -- 91 Int'l Lab. Rev. 180 1965
International Labour Review
internal rules-to rationalise the role of the law in defining and protecting
the rights of members within unions.
In rationalising that role the contract theory implicitly asserts three
basic principles which provide a useful framework for analysis. First,
that the law should properly concern itself with the relation between the
union and its members. By characterising rights within unions as contract
rights it declares that those rights are worthy of legal protection, that the
union's processes may not always be adequate to protect or enforce them,
and that when that occurs the law should intervene.
The second basic principle asserted by the contract theory is that the
rights to be enforced are those prescribed by the union itself. The union, by
adopting its constitution or rules, writes its own body of substantive law
governing its internal affairs, which it is the function of the courts to
enforce. The contract theory thus expresses the fundamental value of
union self-government. It is for the union to design its own structure of
government, select procedures for making decisions and define the rights
of members within the union. The role of the law is to require that the
union's self-determined procedures and rules be followed. Enforcing
the union's substantive law, however, is not always a mechanical function.
Union constitutions are typically general and many provisions are vague
or ambiguous. Before enforcing the contract the courts must interpret it,
choosing between possible meanings. By interpreting, the courts assume
a supplementary but significant role in defining the rights of union members.
The third basic principle is that the law places limits on the union's
freedom to write its own rules. According to the contract theory provisions
in a contract may be declared illegal or ineffective because they violate
legal rules or contravene social policy. Thus in the United States union
rules prohibiting members from criticising union officers have been voided
as " contrary to public policy " and in the United Kingdom union trial
procedures which do not provide the accused with all the elements of a
fair trial are deemed to be in violation of" natural justice " and invalid.
The contract theory is thus used to make union rules subordinate to legal
rules and policies.
It is self-evident that the contract theory does not preclude the law
from protecting rights within the union, but instead justifies legal inter-
vention. Nor does it define the rights to be protected, but rather rationalises
the legal protection given. However, it does serve to emphasise that both
legal and union institutions have concurrent roles. The union has the
primary role in defining the substantive rights, but these may be shaped
by the law through interpretation or supplanted by overriding social
policies.
One critical factor in measuring the role of the law remains. The
impact on union self-government may differ radically according to the
kinds of rights which the law seeks to establish and protect. If the law
fixes union dues, limits the purposes for which union funds can be used,
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requires the union to provide certain social benefits or determines the
suitability of union officers, it thereby transfers the making of these
decisions from the union members to the State. Legal definition of such
rights impoverishes union self-government. The law, however, may have
quite a different thrust. Recent legislation in the United States, for example,
is directed primarily towards protecting the democratic process within
the union, leaving free the decisions to be made through the process.
The right of members to criticise union policy is protected, but the choice
of policy is left to union processes; elections are closely regulated, but
the members decide who shall be the officers; union funds must be used
only for union purposes, but the law does not prescribe those purposes.
The underlying assumption is that if union decisions are the product of a
democratic process they thereby acquire added validity; that union self-
government has greater weight when it is democratic. Thus protection
of basic democratic rights reduces the need and justification for legal
control over union decisions, and the role of the law is self-limiting.
THE RIGHT TO MEMBERSHIP
The threshold right of an individual within the union is his right to
become and remain a member. Denial of membership may deprive him
of three valuable interests. First, it may interfere with his employment if
the collective agreement has a union security provision or the union in
fact enforces such a requirement. The severity of this injury depends upon
the nature of the union security arrangement and its pervasiveness in the
area and industry. Second, it may deprive him of various social benefits
provided by the union. The importance of this depends on the particular
benefits provided and their practical availability elsewhere. Third, it bars
him from any participation in the union's decisions which affect his
welfare. He cannot speak at union meetings, he cannot vote in union
referendums, and he cannot be a candidate for union office. Where the
union exercises substantial control, the individual's rights to participate
may be considered the most important interest involved.
The union may deny an individual some or all of these rights flowing
from union membership by either refusing to admit him to the union or
disciplining him by expulsion. At times exclusion may not be complete,
but may partially deprive the member of his full rights. In general a
union admits to membership all who work within its jurisdiction.
Exceptions exist, however: some unions in the United States exclude
" Communists," "Nazis " or other " subversives "; and in other
countries where unions are organised along political lines workers
adhering to hostile political groups are sometimes excluded. The law
seldom compels the union to admit an individual to membership, but
Switzerland protects the basic right to participate by requiring that a
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collective agreement cannot be extended to non-members unless they
are able to join the union. In the United States the Civil Rights Act of
1964 prohibits any exclusion because of race, religion, sex, or national
origin.
Denial of membership rights through disciplinary action presents far
more serious problems and requires most careful study. In an analysis of
union discipline two elements must be examined: the offences which are
punished and the procedure through which guilt is determined and the
penalty imposed. There is reason to suppose that union rules and proce-
dures are strikingly similar on crucial points of potential danger to the
union's democratic processes. Union rules customarily name a wide
range of offences for which members may be disciplined. More important,
these rules almost always include blanket or catch-all clauses prohibiting
" trouble making "," notorious misconduct ", or" unbecoming conduct "
which can be used to punish almost any conduct. Such provisions give no
adequate guide or warning to the members as to what conduct is prohibited
and, more important, may be used to punish members for exercising basic
rights or to curb the democratic process within the union. The way in
which union discipline clauses are applied is largely unknown: it seems
to be of importance that critical factual inquiries should be made, which
would go beyond the union rules to discover the conduct actually punished.
The central focus of that inquiry should be on the extent to which
discipline is used to curb the member's basic rights.
Disciplinary procedures commonly manifest two characteristics
which are particularly relevant here. First, they are customarily informal,
are conducted without lawyers, and reflect the layman's view of what is
adequate to determine guilt or innocence. As a result they often ignore
safeguards which the law considers crucial. Second, the tribunals are
normally the regular political or administrative bodies of the union, the
local meeting, the officers or executive committees, and the union con-
vention or congress. Neither trial nor appeal is to a separate and indepen-
dent judicial body. The decisions may therefore be influenced by political
considerations.
Legal limitations on union discipline vary widely even though
commonly expressed in terms of the contract theory. In some countries
the courts scrutinise the discipline closely to discover defects: they may
interpret the constitution to protect the individual, discover procedural
flaws to justify invalidating the discipline, or even rejudge the merits of
the case directly. In other countries the courts apparently do not scrutinise
the discipline so closely and give the member far less protection.
Explicit limitations on punishable offences have been most fully
developed in the United States, where there is a prohibition of disciplining
for the exercise of basic democratic rights such as freedom of speech
within the union, the right to support candidates for union office, and
the right to sue the union. In other countries legal limitations on offences
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seem wholly undeveloped. In many countries, however, the law requires
that disciplinary procedures provide a fair hearing for the accused,
although the standards of fairness may be markedly different from country
to country.
THE RIGHT TO PARTICIPATE
One of the individual's most significant rights within the union is
his right to participate in the decisions made by the union which vitally
affect his welfare. The central question is to what extent is the member,
along with his fellow members, able to make his voice heard and have
his wishes weighed in the union's decision-making process? This inquiry
is as difficult as it is important, for a study of formal union structure is
inadequate if not misleading. Inquiry must be made into the inner
political life of the union, the interacting forces and complex processes
through which decisions are in fact made. Our limited purpose here is to
suggest some of the factors to which it should be directed.
The first to be considered is whether participation is direct through
referendums or indirect through the election of officers. Decisions above
the local level are normally made by officers, but there may be important
exceptions. In all of the countries considered except France and Sweden
the calling of strikes is generally decided by a membership vote, but
collective agreements are seldom submitted to the members for ratifica-
tion (except in Hungary and the United States). Only rarely are other
decisions of the national union made subject to referendum.
A second and closely related factor is the remoteness of the decision-
making from the individual members. Decisions taken at the local level
are more likely to be by direct vote of the members, but even if they are
made by officers or delegate bodies the individual will have better oppor-
tunity to make his views known and felt. The more decision is made at
the upper levels of the union structure, the fainter is the voice of the
individual and the greater his feeling of insignificance. No common
pattern of distribution of power between the local and central governing
bodies is evident: one is struck by the complexity of power relationships
within the union and the necessity for scrupulous factual study to deter-
mine where power is in fact exercised.
A third factor affecting the extent of the individual's participation
is the responsiveness to the desires of the members shown by the election
process through which the persons to represent them are selected.
Distortion through fraud in counting the ballots is the least significant
element. Far more important is the directness of the election: whether
officers are elected directly by the members or by delegates who have been
elected by the members or even by other delegates. Responsiveness may
be further deadened by the lack of any opposition or campaigning for
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office. Open contests for national union offices are practically unknown in
some countries and are not common in any. Contests at the local level
are more usual and the election may provide the occasion for criticising
the officers' performance and policies.
Probing and critical analysis of the decision-making process of
unions is sorely needed, for unions commonly conform closely to Michel's
classical "iron law of oligarchy "in political parties. Unions, particularly
at the national level, are largely controlled by a one-party bureaucratic
structure which is able to perpetuate itself in power by its advantages in
access to information, control over channels of communication and
disciplined organisation. Although the officers are practically irremovable,
they normally conceive of themselves as democratic leaders, and are
conscientiously concerned with fulfilling the wishes of their members. In
addition, they often feel far less secure than they are in fact, and are
consequently sensitive to criticism and anxious to placate dissatisfied
groups.
Within this context we can begin to see more clearly the relevance of
certain more specific individual rights to the basic right to participate.
The right of the union member to be fully informed concerning his union's
affairs enables him to make meaningful criticisms and suggestions. The
right of the member to speak freely serves both to inform and arouse
other members and to make officers aware of the reasons for dissatisfac-
tion. The right to organise opposition groups within the union enables
members who disagree with certain policies to make their voices heard.
Although these rights are seldom overtly denied by unions in any country
there is question as to what extent unions affirmatively encourage the
exercise of them or even consider criticism and organised opposition
within the union's political process as entirely legitimate.
In most countries the law gives little or no protection to these rights,
which are elements of the basic right to participate. Recent legislation in
the United States, however, has as its central purpose protection of the
right to participate. It guarantees the right to speak freely, to form groups
with other members, to participate in union meetings, to nominate
candidates and work for their election, and to vote by secret ballot. In
addition, the law has sought to reduce the advantage held by incumbent
officers in election contests by giving opposition candidates equal
opportunity to present their position to the members. Such legislation
adds another line of inquiry: how effective is such legislation in giving
practical protection to these rights?
THE RIGHT TO FAIR PROCEDURES IN UNION TRIBUNALS
The union as a self-governing institution engages in both the
legislation of interests and the adjudication of rights within the union.
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The problem of appropriate procedure arises in expulsion cases, when
the union decides who shall be entitled to a pension, to sick pay, to strike
benefits or even to legal aid in enforcing claims against the employer, for
these are substantial rights and not to be given or denied arbitrarily.
Procedural problems are also raised by the determination of disputes
concerning the validity of elections, the right to particular offices, the
liability for certain dues and assessments, or the constitutional power of
certain officers. The individual's right to a fair hearing when expulsion is
involved is readily recognised, but the importance of guaranteeing a fair
procedure is often overlooked when these other rights are adjudicated
and the procedures for adjudicating yet others are even more incomplete
and are often devoid of even the most elementary safeguards to ensure
fairness.
The most serious problem arises from the lack of any regularly
constituted judicial structure within the union. Union tribunals are
seldom separate organs but simply politically selected officers wearing
judicial caps. Appeals are to other officers at a higher level in the political
hierarchy. Political considerations may intrude and, even if they do not,
the individual may doubt whether his right has been adjudicated objec-
tively and fairly.
An awareness of this special problem is evident in several countries,
such as Belgium, Sweden and Switzerland, where union constitutions
provide for some method of arbitration of internal disputes. In the
United States three unions have created special appeals tribunals made
up entirely of neutral persons outside the union to provide an independent
body to whom members can appeal from decisions of union officers, but
most unions have rejected this device as allowing " outsiders " to meddle
in union affairs.
RIGHTS IN UNION FUNDS
Membership control of union finances is one of the most important
elements of participation in union decisions, for power over the purse is
one of the most strategic powers in any structure of government. While
union members have relatively direct control over the fixing of dues they
have remote control over expenditures, which is far more important in
tailoring union policies. In some countries, such as the United Kingdom,
Sweden and Switzerland, unions give full financial reports to their members,
and the officers are thus made accountable for the conduct of union
affairs. But in others, such as Belgium and the Federal Republic of
Germany, union finances are kept secret. Although the justification
given is to prevent employers from gauging the union's strength the
consequence is to deprive the members of the possibility of criticising or
exercising control.
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Legal controls over finances tend to be greater than over any other
phase of union affairs but they may take two critically different forms.
In South American countries the thrust of the law is to prescribe the
purposes for which union funds may be used and thus to circumscribe
the member's power of self-government. The law in the United Kingdom
presses in the opposite direction: it insists that the decisions of the
members, made through their process of self-government, be followed.
In addition, union members have a legal right to inspect union account
books to determine whether the union rules and decisions are in fact
being followed.
Conclusion
This paper can have no real conclusion, for it seeks to establish a
beginning, not to reach an end. The purpose has not been to describe the
relationship between the union and the individual, but to build a frame-
work of analysis for studying that relationship. The framework, however,
is not neutral, for implicit in the study is the central concern for strengthen-
ing and enriching democratic values. The premise is that unions are an
essential element of a democratic society. There is, therefore, urgent
need to devote searching study to those questions which will enable us
to understand more clearly the special function of unions and the role
their internal processes play in our achieving democratic goals.
(
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